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Parity-specific probabilities of having a next birth are estimated from national 
fertility data and are compared with nation-specific costs of having children as measured 
by time-budget data, by attitude data from the International Social Survey Program, and 
by panel data on labor earnings and standard of living changes following a birth. We 
focus on five countries (the US, West Germany, Denmark, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom), whose fertility rates span the observed fertility range in the contemporary 
industrialized world and whose social welfare and family policies span the conceptual 
space of standard welfare-state typologies.  Definitive conclusions are difficult because of 
the multiple dimensions on which child costs can be measured, the possibility that child 
costs affect both the quantum and the tempo of fertility, the relatively small fertility 
differences across industrialized nations, and the inherent small-N problem resulting from 
nation-level comparisons.   Empirical analysis, however, supports the assertion that 
institutionally driven child costs affect the fertility patterns of industrialized nations.  Do Cross-National Differences in the Costs of Children Generate 
Cross-National Differences in Fertility Rates? 
 
Women’s labor force participation lies at the heart of most explanations for 
fertility levels and change in low fertility societies. The well-documented negative 
association between fertility and women’s labor force activity is attributed frequently to 
the incompatibility between caring for children and taking part in economically 
productive work that typifies industrialized societies (Weller 1977). Thus, women who 
wish to participate in the labor force must either forego or limit childbearing or make 
often complex and sometimes expensive arrangements for the care of their children (e.g. 
Kravdal 1996; Rindfuss and Brewster 1996; Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  Whatever the 
arrangements, the consequence of bearing a (another) child is typically lowered career 
earnings relative to women who forego the birth (e.g., Calhoun and Espenshade 1988; 
Mason and Kuhlthau 1992), though the size of these foregone earnings may vary 
considerably across industrialized nations (Kravdal 1992). 
We expect that the difficulty of working and caring for children simultaneously 
will vary by social context. Key aspects of social context include (1) flexibility in work 
schedules, including the possibility of extended leaves of absence to have and care for 
children, (2) the availability, affordability, and quality of childcare, (3) the amount of 
help with childcare and housework that women receive from their partners, (4) economic 
security provided by own and partner’s labor earnings, supplemented by public policies 
that facilitate access to and the affordability of education, health care, housing, and secure 
employment, and (5) the stability of marriages or cohabitations, and the economic effects 
of separation on the women’s standard of living, as measured by size-adjusted household income (Folbre 1994; Rindfuss, Benjamin and Morgan 2003). These claims are entirely 
consistent with arguments by Esping-Anderson (1999) that low fertility can be 
understood only by examining the interaction of labor markets, the family, and the state.  
This paper examines the relative costs of children along several dimensions in 
five countries: the U.S., the former West Germany, Denmark, Italy and the United 
Kingdom.  These countries were chosen because of their recognizable differences in their 
labor markets, social welfare policies, and cultural orientations toward gender and the 
family.  These countries span the four welfare state types (Anglo-American, 
Conservative, Social Democratic, and Mediterranean) found in theoretical discussions 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Leibfried 1992) and differ in their family policies. Thus, 
we expect variability in the resulting level of tension between work and family for 
women, and arguably therefore in the costs of children (Gauthier 1996; Esping-Andersen 
1999).  We compare these countries in order to determine whether cross-national 
differences in the costs of children could account for observed differences in the pattern 
of fertility.   
COSTS OF CHILDREN AND FERTILITY: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
  
The insights that child rearing involves costs and that fertility may be affected by 
these costs, which go back to Malthus (1933), are in the modern setting typically traced 
to the work of Becker and associates (Becker 1960; Becker and Lewis 1973; Becker 
1993).  As we show below, however, the conceptualization of these costs and how they 
may impact fertility has evolved greatly in the past two decades.  The neoclassical 
approach of the “new home economists” emphasized two major costs involved with 
childbearing and childrearing.  First there are direct monetary costs for food, clothes, 
  2housing, educational costs, medical costs, and so forth which rise not only with changes 
in the price levels of these goods and services but also with the demand for what Becker 
referred to as “quality” children, which, he argued, is correlated with family income.   
Second, the new home economists assumed a universal incompatibility between a 
woman’s market work and her bearing and raising of children.  This incompatibility 
implied opportunity costs, namely the earnings foregone by women as a result of reduced 
labor supply during pregnancy, birth, and childrearing, and the earnings foregone because 
future wages and job status are negatively affected by career interruption.   
Given this perspective, the Becker-inspired approach, which might also be 
characterized as a neoclassical female wage-centered theory, treated the question as one 
of individual-level decisions that are driven by the market value of male and female labor 
(see, e.g., Willis 1973; Butz and Ward 1979; Ermisch 1988; Heckman and Walker 1990; 
Schultz 1994; Rönsen 1998; Di Tommaso 1999; Liefbroer and Corijn 1999; Kalwij 2000; 
Lundberg 2000). A higher market wage for women (e.g. from higher levels of education) 
is argued to have both (positive) income and (negative) substitution effects on fertility, 
with opposite effects on female labor force participation. The substitution effect implies 
that when earnings per hour increase, the opportunity cost for reducing labor hours to 
have more children increases, thus leading to a dampening effect on fertility. The income 
effect refers to the fact that when income increases (e.g. from higher education), the 
demand for children would increases if the quantity of children is what economists call a 
normal good.
1  Offsetting this income effect is the postulated relationship between 
income and demand for what Becker referred to as “higher quality” children, who are 
better educated, better fed, better clothed, and who receive better medical care. Taken 
  3together, these arguments imply an ambiguous link between family income and the 
quantity of children.  
Empirical evidence has not reduced this ambiguity.  At the micro-level (i.e., the 
effort to explain individual variation in fertility in terms of individual variation in wages), 
some studies find support, while others do not (see e.g., Ahn and Mira 2001; Andersson 
2001; DeWit and Ravanera 1998; Ermisch 1989; Hoem and Hoem 1989; Kravdal 1992; 
for an overview of empirical studies see Hotz et al. 1997).  At the macro-level, the 
situation is the same. By the logic of the neoclassical model, given stable “child quality” 
trends toward higher wages for women would generate downward trends in fertility rates 
(Becker 1993; Butz and Ward 1979; Ahn and Mira 2002).  But this hypothesis has 
received at best indirect support in the form of negative correlations between long run 
fertility and wage trends in industrialized societies (Mincer 1985; Becker 1993; Eckstein, 
Mira, and Wolpin 1998, but see e.g., Gauthier and Hatzius 1997 for contradictory 
results).   
Similarly unsupportive results concern predictions from the neoclassical approach 
concerning how female labor force participation is connected to fertility.  The economics 
approach (see the discussion in Engelhardt, Kögel, and Prskawetz 2001) tends to assume 
that the relationship between female labor force participation and fertility is exogenously 
determined by trends in wages, unemployment, and other variables – and so in this sense 
the association between fertility and female labor force participation can be viewed as a 
kind of surrogate for the underlying neoclassical prediction concerning the relationship 
between wages and fertility.  But descriptive tabulations (Ahn and Mira 2002; Brewster 
and Rindfuss 2000; Rindfuss et al. 2003) show that the correlation between female labor 
  4force participation and fertility has actually reversed in the past fifteen years, while 
econometrically more rigorous analysis finds no evidence during this recent period that 
these variables have a causal impact on each other (Engelhardt, Kögel, and Prskawetz 
2001). 
Because the neoclassical female wage-centered theory poorly explains both cross-
national variation in fertility levels across industrialized countries and time trends in these 
levels (Engelhardt and Prskawetz 2002), an alternative hypothesis has emerged.  This 
alternative hypothesis focuses attention on the extent to which state and society have 
socialized the costs of raising families and thereby given women “autonomy vis-à-vis the 
family and the economy” (Sainsbury 1996; see also McDonald 2000a, 2000b).  The 
neoclassical presumption that fertility and work are incompatible choices, and that this 
incompatibility produces a negative effect of the market wage on fertility via substitution 
effects, is instead theorized in the gendered approach to welfare states as a historically 
and geographically contingent relationship.   The necessity to withdraw from the labor 
force when having children creates financial dependence of women on her male partner, 
who then functions as the family “breadwinner.”  States can use social policies to 
discourage female autonomy and promote familial dependence, e.g., through the German 
principle of “subsidiarity” which places the primary responsibility for social welfare on 
the family – more specifically the family breadwinner (Clasen and Freeman 1994; 
Esping-Andersen 1990).   Alternatively, states can promote female autonomy from the 
male breadwinner by giving women the right to be “commodified” as paid labor even 
when they have small children, and the right to form and maintain an autonomous 
household even when no male breadwinner is present (Orloff 1993). Thus, the promotion 
  5of female familial autonomy is synonymous with the reduction of incompatibility 
between work and childrearing. 
While the reversal in the cross-sectional correlation between female labor force 
participation and fertility from negative to positive suggests that the incompatibility 
between work and childrearing may be weakening across industrialized societies, 
(Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Rindfuss, Benjamin, and Morgan 2003; Rindfuss and 
Brewster 1996; Pampel 2001), any universal trends in this direction are clearly 
proceeding at different rates in different countries  (Engelhardt, Kögel, and Prskawetz 
2001; Kögel 2002).
2    In light of the continuing large differences in social welfare 
policies across industrial societies, it is therefore arguable that cross-national variation in 
the “direct costs” of children that stem from a woman’s reduced earnings are dominated 
not by differences in wage structures but rather by differences in the institutions that 
either affect the level of work-family incompatibility or that compensate families for 
having children at the price of reduced female contributions to household standard of 
living.  The cost and availability of child-care, the regularity of the school calendar, the 
willingness of men to share domestic work, maternity leave laws and corporate policies 
that raise or lower the career penalty for interruptions, and that facilitate or impede 
flexible work schedules may play a larger role in determining the amount and duration of 
a labor supply reduction than would wages per se.  Child costs to the household are 
further reduced at the individual level when these costs are socialized through subsidies 
for housing, education, reduced taxes or direct transfers related to the presence of 
children.     
  6All of these considerations suggest that macro-level factors may play a more 
important role than wages in accounting for cross-national variation in fertility rates 
across industrialized countries.   While such a claim has intuitive appeal, macro-level 
explanations are difficult to confirm because the number of degrees of freedom tends to 
be small and the sources of macro variability large.  This fundamental limitation requires 
an alternative set of strategies for research design and hypothesis testing. 
One approach estimates the effects of specific components of a society’s child-
costs factors that vary at the individual level.   For example, Blau and Robins (1989) 
analyzed the effects of a greater availability of childcare on fertility in the U.S., while 
Kravdal (1996) conducted a similar study for Norway, and Büchel and Spiess (2002) and 
Hank (2002) have conducted similar studies for western Germany.   While the results of 
these studies have generally been in the predicted direction, the estimated effects are not 
strong.  
A second approach has been to pool aggregate-level fertility data for a group of 
industrialized countries over a number of years, to introduce variables measuring the size 
of family benefits as well as indicators of economic conditions, and to determine whether 
higher family benefits tend to be associated with higher fertility across countries and over 
time (Ermisch 1988; Zhang et al. 1994; Caudill and Mixon 1993; Blanchet and Ekert-
Jaffé 1994; Gauthier and Hatzius 1997).  Some of these studies have found that family 
benefits increase fertility or at least lower the age of entry into motherhood.  Gauthier and 
Hatzius’s study uses the longest time series (twenty years) and considers both the effects 
of cash benefits and maternity leave across 22 countries, using country and time-specific 
fixed effects with country-specific lagged values of fertility rates as instrumental 
  7variables.  They find that larger monthly family allowances increase the estimated age-
specific fertility rate especially for the first birth with the size of the effect being 
heterogeneous (larger in Scandinavia, and smaller in the Anglo-Saxon countries).  At the 
same time, Gauthier and Hatzius found an insignificant effect on fertility rates of the 
duration of maternity leave or the replacement rate of pay during this leave.  
The econometric results (particularly those of Gauthier and Hatzius) strongly 
suggest that social institutions which affect child costs influence fertility rates.  At the 
same time, even the Gauthier and Hatzius results probably do not tell the whole story, for 
several reasons.  First, the range of effects is small compared with the observed cross-
national variation in fertility rates.
3  Second, consistency of the estimator depends 
critically on the assumptions used to identify the model.
4  Thirdly, their estimates of 
family benefit effects are problematic in the context of other parameter effects in their 
model.
5  Increased affordability of children may well increase the fertility rate.  If true, 
however, we would expect that factors which facilitate the ability of women to work 
while raising children could have effects that are potentially much larger than family 
benefits, because the amount of income to be preserved is potentially much greater.  One 
of the problems in refining this hypothesis, however, is that the literature does not give a 
complete picture of the total impact of the institutional complex that affects each nation’s 
distribution of costs related to child birth and child rearing.  In our view, a determination 
of this distribution requires a more careful examination of the variation across countries 
in the multiple dimensions of child costs that together define for the potential mother the 
level of incompatibility between children, work, and other aspects of a modern life style.   
  8Our efforts are devoted to assessing these costs along three dimensions: the 
perceived compatibility between childrearing and work by mothers when the children are 
young, the time commitment that mothers must make in order to raise children, and the 
impact of labor supply reductions by mothers as mitigated by government tax and 
transfer polices on changes in the standard of living for families following a birth.     
These three factors are obviously interrelated.  After all, it is the time commitment that a 
woman makes to the raising of children that constrains her ability to work.  Furthermore, 
because two-earner families rely on the woman’s wages to maintain their standard of 
living, earnings reductions by women will generally have a negative impact on household 
standard of living.  Finally, one would expect a woman to perceive greater 
incompatibility between work and childrearing in a country where the domestic time 
demands on mothers are high and where the labor supply reductions following childbirth 
are great.   
At the same time, it is also clear that the correlation between these factors can be 
considerably less than unity.   The impact on the household standard of living from a 
woman’s reduction in labor earnings connected with a birth will depend upon the level of 
partner’s earnings, the pre-pregnancy ratio of mother to partner earnings, and the extent 
of mitigation provided to the family via family benefits.   Furthermore, while one would 
expect women who withdraw from the labor market to do a higher share of domestic 
work than women who do not, differences in cultural expectations about the division of 
labor between male and female partners, differences in cultural expectations about the 
way domestic life is organized, and the availability and cultural evaluation of domestic 
labor-saving technology can all vary across countries (Gershuny 2000; Bianchi et al. 
  92000).   Finally, while one would expect women whose domestic time burdens are high 
to perceive a greater incompatibility between work and childrearing, the perception of 
incompatibility can also arise from differing cultural evaluations of the importance of 
full-time mothering on child development, and from cross-national differences in the 
valuation of individual autonomy and the sources of this autonomy, and thus the 
psychological and social costs and benefits of working for women as well as men.  To 
rephrase, the impact of each of these costs in a society depends both on that country’s 
particular mix of policies and institutional characteristics and also on the distribution of 
values in that society.   
Fertility differences across countries result from distinctive parity-specific rate 
patterns.  One country’s fertility can be lower than another primarily because of higher 
proportions of childless women, or through higher proportions of women who choose to 
have only one child, and so forth.  If one is trying to explain these differences in terms of 
the costs of children, it is important to consider variation in child costs with parity and 
across the woman’s life course (e.g., Namboodiri 1972, 1983).  One obvious reason for 
such variation would be if incremental family benefits or tax savings from the state vary 
according to the number of children.  However, it is likely that a larger source of 
variation is associated with the impact of childbearing on the woman’s labor force 
participation, and the impact of small children in the household on the number of hours 
that she is likely to work per week.  Other sources of variation might arise from 
differential probabilities of union dissolution by parity.   If the costs of children have an 
impact on the number of children, then variations in costs by parity should affect cross-
national differences in parity progressions and in the timing of parity progressions. 
  10In the next section, we compare fertility differences between Germany, the U.S., 
Italy, Denmark, and the U.K. and we review institutional differences between the five 
countries that may contribute to differences in the average cost of children.   
THE FIVE-COUNTRY COMPARISON 
Fertility Patterns and Trends 
From the early 1970s until the mid 1990s, the period total fertility rate was below 
the replacement level (of approximately 2.08) in all five countries considered in this 
paper.   Our theoretical arguments, however, focus on parity-specific decisions made in 
given years.  We argue that labor market effects, childcare market effects, social policy 
effects, and socio-cultural effects vary both cross-nationally and historically.  Further, 
these institutional arrangements create historically and cross-nationally varying parity-
specific costs of having another child.
6  Thus, a theoretically appropriate measure for our 
analysis would be a period-specific parity progression ratio that compares births to 
exposure (e.g., first births to childless women.. See NiBhrolchain 1992).  However given 
the relatively low risk of  a birth (especially of a given parity) in a calendar year, the 
individual level panel data that we use do not provide reliable estimates of these ratios. 
Thus, we turn to commonly available trend data (from birth registration and census data) 
to calculate the total fertility rate and the parity specific total fertility rate.  
These data have two weaknesses.  First, the parity specific TFR is a function of a 
structural factor as well as a compositional one, i.e. it reflects the combination of the risk 
of having a child at parity x (the “period parity progression ratio”) and the proportion of 
women at parity x. We are exploring the sensitivity of our estimates to this compositional 
influence in ongoing work. Second, there is inconsistency in the reporting of parity across 
  11countries. Specifically, two of the five countries (Germany and the U.K.) have vital 
registration systems that record parity as “previous births in this union” (as opposed to 
number of previous births). The resulting bias is predictable; reports of births in this 
union increase estimates of the first and second order TFR (relative to reports of true 
parity).  Our ongoing work also examines the magnitude of the bias introduced by this 
inconsistency.  
While acknowledging these problems, we are confident that the general patterns 
described here cannot be traced to these weaknesses in the data.  Thus, we take the TFR 
and parity-specific TFR rates for the five countries as imperfect estimates of the 
underlying parameters of interest.  We show these estimates in Table 1 (rows 1 and 3-5).  
Following Bongaarts and Feeney (1998), we have also estimated the mean shift in 
childbearing for each parity (ri) and calculated an adjustment factor for timing shifts (1- 
ri); these results are shown in rows 2 and 6-8 of Panels A and B. The adjusted TFR (row 
2, which is referred to as TFR′) is interpreted as the period quantum of fertility or the 
TFR in the absence of timing shifts. In rows 6-8 of panels A and B, we calculated the 
parity progression ratios implied by TFR′ at each parity.  These parity specific TFR′ 
estimates provide the preferred estimates of the behavioral parameters we wish to 
explain, i.e., in a given period and at a given parity what is the U.S. vs. W. German risk 
(for instance) of having another child.  
Table 1 about here 
These data show that the five countries in this study can be broadly classified into 
three groups.  The U.S. and the U.K., which make up the first group, have the highest 
overall fertility rate.  Denmark’s overall fertility rate is somewhat lower than that of the 
  12U.S. or the U.K., but this is mostly because Danish women have a considerably lower 
PPR from the second to the third birth.  The probability that a Danish woman will have a 
first birth is actually as high as or higher than the corresponding probability for a British 
or American woman.   Germany and Italy, which form the third group of countries, have 
the lowest fertility rates.  Germany’s low fertility rate is due mostly to the relatively low 
probability of a first birth, while Italy’s low fertility rate is a consequence of its relatively 
low PPR at all transitions.   In the next sections, we examine whether these cross-national 
differences in fertility are related to cross-national differences in the costs of children. 
Work, Time-Use and Perceived Incompatibility between Work and Childrearing 
Rates of employment by mothers with young children in the household vary 
considerably across the five countries in our study.  At the beginning of the 1990s, the 
percentage of gainfully employed women with children under age six in couple-headed 
families was much lower in Germany, Italy, and the U.K., than in the U.S., which in turn 
had considerably lower rates than Denmark.   Except for Denmark, which already had 
very high maternal employment, the rates have increased since then.  The rise has been 
particularly fast in the U.K., which by the end of the 1990s had reached U.S. levels.  
Rates have risen also in Germany and Italy, but maternal employment remains 
considerably lower in these two countries than in the UK, the U.S., and Denmark (see 
Table 2).  Table 2 also shows considerable differences in rates of part-time work; 
working mothers in the U.K. and Germany, working mothers are more likely to be part-
time than in the U.S. or Italy.  The cross-country pattern of employment for lone mothers 
is different from the pattern for coupled mothers. Italian mothers of young children, who 
  13are least likely to work if they have a partner, are most likely to be working full-time if 
they have no partner.  
Table 2 about here 
Cross-country differences in child-care situations fit with the big cross-national 
difference in employment patterns. While important cross-national differences exist in 
the day care coverage for older children, table 3 shows that the dramatic contrast occurs 
when children are under three years of age.  The proportion of children under age three in 
formal child-care in Germany and Italy is very low.  The U.K. is midway between Italy 
and the U.S., while Denmark has the highest coverage.
7  Clearly the rates of child-care 
coverage across the five countries vary inversely with the rates of employment by 
mothers with young children.   
Table 3 about here 
Aggregate data reviewed so far suggest that the opportunity costs of bringing up 
children are higher in Germany and Italy than in the U.K., Denmark, or the U.S. due to 
the apparently greater difficulty of combining work and child-rearing.  A key question is 
whether maternity benefits, family allowances and tax relief can offset the income loss 
due to reduced working time. As Table 3 shows, German women get 100% of their 
average wage as a maternity benefit for 14 weeks (six weeks before and eight weeks after 
childbirth), while in Denmark paid leave lasts for 28 weeks and in Italy and the UK the 
benefits are 20 and 18 weeks, respectively (restrictions on these benefits, e.g., to women 
with sufficient prior work experience, vary by country).  The United States has no 
statutory paid parental leave, and American women are guaranteed the right to return to 
  14employment following a birth for only a relatively short period of employment 
interruption compared to their counterparts in the four European countries.  
There are also differences across countries in the average amount of time engaged 
in childcare and domestic labor by women with young children in the house.  The greater 
time spent in raising and educating a child in Germany, Italy, and the U.K. provides 
another disincentive for a woman to combine work and family. Data from time budget 
surveys (OECD 2001) show that in couple-headed families with a child under five, full-
time women workers in Germany, Italy and the U.K. spend over thirty minutes per day 
more on domestic work than do American or Danish women.  Except for the case of 
Italy, this extra burden seems not to be due to cross-national differences in the amount of 
domestic work done by male partners, but rather to differences in the organization of 
households that creates a larger total amount of housework to be done.
8  Similar cross-
national differences exist for stay-at-home mothers, with German, U.K. and Italian 
mothers doing over 1 hour more work per day than their counterparts in the Denmark and 
the U.S. 
Table 4 about here 
Public opinion data show strong cross-national differences in women’s views 
concerning incompatibility between work and childrearing.  In 1994, the International 
Social Survey Program module, “Family and Changing Gender Roles” included attitude 
items regarding the incompatibility of work and childrearing.  Although Denmark did not 
participate in this survey, two other Scandinavian countries, namely Sweden and Norway, 
did participate, and we use them as stand-ins for Denmark. In all six countries (see table 
5), women reject the idea that women should stay home and take care of the family while 
  15men earn money.  However, the countries diverge in the proportion of women who take 
an affirmative stance on the value of work and who see this work as incompatible with 
the interests of children and families.  German and Italian women are much more likely 
to view full-time work by women, and work in general by mothers as harmful to family 
life and to the development of a child (the first two items shown in Table 5).  Women in 
Great Britain and the U.S. are much less likely to agree with these items, while women in 
Scandinavia are least likely to agree.   Importantly, German and Italian women in 
particular also see work as especially important for their own life.  Larger proportions of 
women in Italy and Germany think that work is the best way for a woman to be an 
“independent person.”  Women in Scandinavia are least likely to agree with this item, 
while women in the U.S. and the U.K. are again intermediate.   Italian women, 
meanwhile, are the most likely to disagree that being a housewife is as fulfilling as 
working for pay, while a large majority of German and Scandinavian women also reject 
this assertion.  British women are more likely to agree with this assertion, though 
agreement still comes from only a minority of women, while a bare majority of American 
women think that being a housewife can be as rewarding as work.    
Table 5 about here 
In summary, data on attitudes, on employment patterns, on family benefits, and on 
time spent in domestic labor suggest significant differences in the costs of children in 
these five countries.  Denmark is the country with the highest rate of female employment, 
the highest availability of public childcare, and the most generous family benefits.    If it 
is like Sweden and Norway, it is also the country with the smallest perceived 
incompatibility between working and child-rearing, and it has relatively low time burdens 
  16for mothers.  Germany and Italy are the countries where work-family incompatibility 
seems to be the strongest; they have the highest proportion of nonworking mothers, the 
lowest proportion of children in formal childcare, the highest time burden of motherhood, 
and the highest perceived disjuncture between working, children and family life.  
Germany has more generous family benefits than Italy, though it is not clear from the 
data presented so far whether these benefits are large enough to offset the costs of 
children imposed by the incompatibility between work and childrearing.  The U.S. and 
the U.K. are intermediate on these measures.
9    
The Consequences of Births for Earnings and Standard of Living 
We now present estimates of the impact of births on earnings and on size-adjusted 
household income, which we refer to as “standard of living.”  In order to make our 
estimates as comparable as possible, we present these estimates in two sets.  First, we 
compare the U.S. and West Germany using data from the 1981-1997 waves of the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), from the 1984-2000 waves of the German Socio 
Economic Panel (GSOEP), and from the PSID-GSOEP Cross-National Equivalent File 
for these waves.   These panel studies cover roughly comparable periods of time, they are 
long enough to allow estimates of both short and medium term consequences of a birth, 
and they make use of earnings and income measures from the PSID-GSOEP Equivalence 
file that were designed to be as comparable as possible (Burkhauser et al. 2000). 
Our analyses focus on the women who were between 18 and 40 years old in the 
“focal year” (defined below), present in the family at the time of the interview, and 
reported as a head of the household or a wife/long-term cohabitor of the household head.  
  17We further restrict our comparison to white women in the U.S. and native Germans in the 
former West Germany.
10  
In order to broaden the comparison to the other three countries, we also analyze 
data from six waves of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP).  Our sample 
for these analyses consists of female citizens between the ages of 18 and 40 in the focal 
year from Germany, United Kingdom, Denmark, and Italy.  In the case of Germany, we 
restrict attention to those living in the former West Germany, excluding West Berlin.
11  
For the UK, we use the ECHP series that is drawn from the British Household Panel 
Study, while for Germany, we use the ECHP series that is drawn from the GSOEP.  
Therefore, the underlying data used in both the two country comparison and the four 
country comparison involving Germany is drawn from the same underlying source, 
though the specific years are different, the samples are somewhat different, and the 
variables in question are a subset of the GSOEP variables that were in some cases subject 
to additional editing by the ECHP staff.
12 
For the U.S. vs. West German comparison, we compute changes over time in 
individual labor earnings, household labor earnings, household size adjusted pre-
tax/transfer earnings, and household size-adjusted post-tax and transfer earnings (i.e., 
“standard of living”).
13  In the following analyses, we compare earnings and standard of 
living in subsequent years with earnings and standard of living two calendar years before 
a specific year, called the focal year, in which the event of a birth either did or did not 
occur.  We present information not only about mean change in these values, but also 
about change at three important points in the earnings/standard of living distribution for 
each country, namely the 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentile.  We further restrict attention in the 
  18tables to women who were living in the household at the time of the interview and who 
were living with a partner (whether married or cohabiting) in the year before the focal 
year (the “lagged year”).  Couples are grouped according to whether or not the birth in 
question was the first birth, and according to whether or not there were children younger 
than six living in the household in the lagged year.  After controlling for these factors, we 
compute changes in standard of living between the calendar year two years before the 
focal year (“the base year”) and calendar years beyond the focal year.  We also compute 
changes in the share of labor (wage and salary and self-employment) earnings earned by 
the women as a function of whether there was a birth in the focal year.  
The ECHP comparison is similar to the PSID-GSOEP comparison, though some 
differences are dictated by its study design.   Aside from the shorter time-span covered by 
the ECHP (1994-1999), the ECHP includes household post-government tax/ transfer 
income but not pre-government tax/transfer income.
14  Therefore, we can measure the 
cost of births, but not the specific extent to which these costs are mitigated by 
government policies.   Furthermore, the ECHP does not provide information about the 
total number of children a woman has had.  Therefore in our ECHP analyses we control 
for the absence of children age 0-5 at the survey date of the lagged year rather than 
whether the birth is a first birth.  Otherwise, the ECHP data are used in parallel fashion to 
the PSID-GSOEP comparison; we compute the difference in the share of labor earnings 
by the woman in couple-headed households and the difference in standard of living 
according to whether or not there was a birth and according to whether or not there were 
already small children in the household.
15 
  19Our goal in these analyses is not to identify and estimate a specific regression 
parameter that could be defended as the “causal effect” of childbirth on standard of living 
(SOL) in these countries.  Instead we are interested in the costs of children as a factor that 
potentially influences fertility decisions.  We find it implausible that respondents have 
precise knowledge of costs that analysts struggle to uncover and estimate.  Instead, we 
believe that respondents look around at others in their society and observe the same 
descriptive information that we analyze in survey data (e.g., the extent of declines in 
standard of living associated with a birth), and they draw their conclusions from these 
observations.  Thus, we present the distribution of outcomes for relevant subpopulations 
for these five countries in order to see if the cross-national differences are distinct enough 
and follow an order that makes them plausible explanations for the observed cross-
national differences in fertility rates. 
Table 6 compares the income and standard of living response to births of 
American and German women who had no previous children, who had no children under 
the age of 18 living in the household in the previous year, and who had a partner in the 
household at the survey date of the previous year.  The first panel shows mean estimates, 
while subsequent panels show responses at the 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentiles of the 
distribution.  
Table 6 about here 
The first row shows that both American and German women without children 
provided slightly over 40% of household earnings in the base year.
16 The second row 
shows the post-focal year share of household labor earnings, broken down by whether or 
not there was a birth in the focal year.  The female share of labor earnings drops 
  20substantially following a birth in both countries, but the drop is much larger in Germany, 
where the mean woman went from contributing 43% to only 10% of household labor 
earnings.  Because of this sharp drop in women’s labor earnings, the German household 
experienced a 36% reduction in pre-tax/transfer standard of living, which is much larger 
than the 20% reduction for the American woman.  The fourth row then shows the impact 
of German tax and welfare state benefits.  As expected, these effects are considerably 
larger in Germany than in the U.S.; they mitigate the standard of living reduction by 14 
percentage points, which is nearly three times the size of mitigation in the U.S.  But this 
German advantage stemming from the social welfare system is not large enough to offset 
entirely the German disadvantage stemming from the reduction of female earnings.  Even 
after taking into account of social benefits, the mean German household experiences a 
22% reduction in standard of living over the three year period of time versus only a 15% 
reduction in the U.S.  As an illustration, if we assume a size-adjusted pre-birth household 
income of $50,000 (corresponding to a $70,700 income for a two person household) in 
both countries, these reductions produce after birth values of $42,500 in size-adjusted 
dollars three years later in the U.S. (i.e., $73,600 in income for a three-person household) 
and $39,000 in Germany (i.e., $67,500 in income for a three-person household). This 
example shows that the costs of a birth are substantial and the differential cost ($3,500 in 
size-adjusted dollars) is considerable.  These estimates actually understate the true cost of 
children, because households who did not experience a birth gained in standard of living 
over this period of time, as shown in columns 3 and 4. 
Table 7 about here 
  21Mean changes provide an incomplete picture of the distribution of consequences of 
having a child.  Women have a range of earnings before a birth, have partners with a 
range of earnings, and reduce their labor earnings by a variable amount in response to a 
birth.  The second, third, and fourth panels provide an indication of these variable 
responses, and how the distributions vary between the two countries. Standard of living 
declines associated with a birth are greatest at lower percentiles of the distribution in both 
countries. The biggest difference between the two countries can be seen at the median 
and the 75
th percentile.  At the median, German women contribute relatively more to the 
household than do American women before the birth.  But while American women’s 
share of labor earnings drops by nearly half from the pre-birth median, the median 
German woman makes no contribution to labor earnings at all in the year following a 
birth.  As with the previous comparisons, the German welfare state does more mitigation, 
but the net result is that the German household suffers a bigger fall in standard of living.  
The same pattern presents itself at the 75
th percentile.  At the 75
th percentile, the share of 
post-birth labor earnings by American women is nearly as high as for mean pre-birth 
share of labor earnings.  The German contrast to this pattern is striking; even at the 75
th 
percentile, the post-birth German woman contributes less than 10% of household labor 
earnings.  While the reduction of post tax/transfer standard of living at the 75
th percentile 
is relatively small, it is 12 percentage points lower than the American figure.  
The standard of living impact of a second child is shown in Table 7.  Again the 
impacts of a birth are greatest on those at lower percentiles of the standard of living 
distribution. In contrast, the cross-national difference in the standard of living impact of a 
second child is relatively small.  The mean impact is very similar in the two countries.  
  22The reason for this is readily apparent in the first two rows of Table 7.  In contrast to the 
first birth, German women experience a relatively small reduction in labor supply 
following the second birth.  This puts the costs of the child in terms of labor earnings and 
post-government household standard of living for Germany at roughly the same level as 
in the U.S. 
Table 7 about here 
Table 8 looks an additional two years into the future and examines differences in 
the impact of a birth according to the average household situation over the four years 
following a birth according to whether the woman had previous births and had children 
younger than 6 in the household in the lagged year.  The top panel applies to women with 
no previous births. These results show that the German disadvantage remains strong in 
terms of market income alone, but post-tax/transfer differences between nations are 
smaller across an average of the four years than at the two year mark.  Gaps, however, 
persist at all four points of the distribution.   
Table 8 about here 
The bottom panel of Table 8 provides information about the socioeconomic 
impact of the second and subsequent births on standard of living change in the two 
countries.  The results of this table can be quickly and clearly summarized.  They show 
that German households are not at a disadvantage relative to American households 
concerning the costs of subsequent births.  They also show the reason for this contrast.  
Once one child is in the household, the German family is much less reliant on the 
woman’s labor earnings than it was before the first birth.  The German tax and transfer 
  23system is better able to offset this smaller reduction in labor earnings in contrast to the 
large reduction in labor earnings following the first birth.   
Next, we turn to the four-country comparison using the ECHP data.   Because the 
ECHP panels are shorter than the PSID and GSOEP panels, we can only compute the 
three year change in earnings and standard of living around a birth to obtain results that 
are parallel to those reported in Tables 6 and 7.  Table 9 contrasts Denmark, Germany, 
Italy and the U.K. for women who had no children under 6 in the household in the lagged 
year.  In the base year, Italy stands out as having relatively low female earnings 
contributions even before the birth of a child.  The birth of a child, however, has sharply 
different implications for female earnings in the four countries.  Earnings fall relatively 
little in the countries at the two extremes of day care provision, namely Denmark (where 
formal day care is extensive) and Italy (where formal day care is meager, but where 
women’s contribution is low even before motherhood).  Employment in the U.K. drops 
much more sharply, while German women show by far the largest drop.   By the calendar 
year following the birth, the German women by a considerable margin have the smallest 
share of labor earnings in the four countries.  Italy is the second lowest by virtue of its 
low starting point, while the U.K. is third.  When combined with possible labor supply 
responses by males and with state tax and transfer policies, one finds that the first birth 
was the most expense for the family’s standard of living in Germany, followed by the 
U.K., Italy, and then Denmark.   Simply put, the falloff in standard of living is highest in 
countries where the woman’s contribution to household labor earnings drops the most.   
Table 9 about here 
  24The picture is somewhat different if one contrasts women who did and did not 
have a birth but otherwise were similar on couple status and presence of small children 
(i.e., one compares the left and right columns of table 9).  By this measure, Britain rises 
to challenge Germany as the country with the highest costs because British gains were the 
highest for this population over these years.  This is somewhat misleading, however, for 
two reasons.  First, a portion of the British advantage on gains comes from very young 
partnered women who rapidly increased their labor earnings following schooling; when 
we restrict the sample to women aged 22-40 (results available upon request), the outsize 
British gains are reduced and German relative costs are again the highest.  More 
importantly, from a behavioral perspective, we think it dubious that women can predict 
societal trends in average incomes over time (even professional economists do not do this 
well!).  If we presume that women in all four countries foresee the same benchmark SOL 
trajectory for the “no births” counterfactual situation, then the calculations on the left side 
of the table by themselves give the correct country ordering of the costs of children.  
Table 10 reports the same statistics for women who had a small child in the 
household in the lagged year.  Consistent with the results of Table 9, Danish women with 
small children are contributing a larger share of household labor earnings than their 
counterparts in Germany, Italy and the U.K., while German and Italian women have the 
lowest share.  The consequence of a birth for this group of women is again to depress 
female German labor earnings the most and to depress female Italian and Danish labor 
earnings the least.  The important difference with Table 9, however, is that German 
mothers with small children already contribute such a small share of labor earnings that 
the depressing effect of another birth is not considerable.   It is at the 25
th percentile 
  25where the strongest country differences show up, with Italy having the highest costs.  
Notably, Italy’s high costs at the lower parts of the distribution are not generated by the 
impact of the birth on the woman’s earnings so much as by the combination of a small 
female reduction combined with apparently high male earnings instability.  The next 
largest decline occurs in the U.K. and then Germany.  The univariate statistics suggest 
that the declines in the UK and Germany are driven more by reductions in female 
earnings than is the case in Italy.  At the median, the declines in the four countries are 
more similar, with Italy and Germany having slightly larger declines than the U.K. and 
Denmark.  At the 75
th percentile, women in all four countries enjoy significant gains in 
standard of living.   
Table 10 about here 
THE IMPACT OF CHILDCARE COSTS 
Tables 6-10 have the deficiency of not taking childcare costs into account.   If 
mothers return to work soon after giving birth but pay for some third party to care for the 
child while they work, this expense offsets a portion of the mother’s earnings and reduces 
the household standard of living.  Conversely, by staying home, a formerly working 
mother will no longer contribute to the household labor earnings, but will obviate the 
need for the family to pay for external childcare.  The PSID contains information each 
year on the amount of money that families pay for childcare, but this level of detail is not 
available in the other household surveys.  The other surveys, however, do contain some 
useful information that allows at least a crude estimate of the impact of differential 
childcare expenses on the financial impact of a birth.   The GSOEP contains information 
  26on whether the family was paying for childcare in one specific year (1996), while the 
BHPS and the ECHP contained similar questions for Britain, and for Denmark and Italy.  
Using this information, we computed the proportion of women in families who 
paid for childcare for the various subsamples shown in Tables 6-10 and report these 
proportions in Table 11, Panel 1.   Not surprisingly, these proportions vary directly with 
the proportion of children in formal day care, as reported in Table 3.  We have been able 
to find relatively little information about the average costs of daycare in various 
countries.  Perhaps the best source is Meyers and Gornick (2000, 2003), who provide 
information about the proportion of each country’s publicly-provided day care expenses 
that are paid by parents, which we reproduce in Table 11, Panel 2.
17  We then estimated 
the actual costs for childcare in the U.S. for those who paid for childcare and the 
proportion of their after tax and transfer household income that they paid.  As a rough 
approximation, we then assumed that the costs in other countries for those who paid 
would be in the same proportion to the U.S. costs as was the family share of childcare 
costs in that country relative to the U.S.
18   This assumption then gives an estimate of the 
proportion of household income paid in the five other countries by those who paid.  
When multiplied by the country-specific proportion of mothers who were paying for 
childcare and when adjusted for household size, we obtain the adjusted costs of children 
shown in the bottom two rows of Table 11.  This adjustment narrows slightly the standard 
of living gap between countries with high labor force withdrawal versus low labor force 
withdrawal by mothers.   
Table 11 about here 
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In Table 12 we summarize the available evidence on fertility and child costs.   
Generally speaking, Denmark, the U.S., and the U .K. have higher fertility rates and 
lower costs of children than do Germany and Italy on the nonmonetary dimensions 
discussed in this paper.  The situation with respect to monetary costs is more 
complicated.  At the parity zero transition, the costs for German families of a first birth 
appear to be definitely higher than in the other four countries, and Germany is the country 
whose PPR for the first birth is the lowest of the five.  It is also the case that Denmark has 
the highest estimated PPR at parity zero, and Denmark also has the lowest estimated 
monetary costs to a first birth.  However, Italy’s lower PPR at parity zero than that of the 
U.S. or the U.K. does not seem attributable to the high median monetary costs of a first 
birth in Italy.  Ambiguity also exists for the parity 1 PPR.  In support of the hypothesis 
that costs of children influence fertility rates is our finding that the UK has the highest 
tempo-adjusted PPR at parity 1 and also has the lowest monetary costs from our 
estimates.  However, the country differences estimated in our analysis at parity one 
appear to be small and the specific rankings of countries could very well change if the 
estimates could be refined or recomputed on a new sample.     
Some aspects of our analyses of the monetary costs of childbirth are arguably 
quite robust, however.  Danish women experience relatively low financial consequences 
of births because of a combination of the weak effect of births on female labor supply and 
the heavily subsidized cost of childcare in Denmark.  In Germany the monetary costs of 
the first birth are relatively high, because of a large labor supply reduction of women 
around the time of birth that is not fully made up for by welfare state benefits.   In Italy, 
the standard of living costs of the first birth are not exceptionally high because women 
  28are not working in large numbers before the first birth.  Finally, women in the U.S. and in 
the U.K. exhibit relatively high variance in their labor supply response to a birth.     
Our results suggest country-specific explanations for the relative ranking of each 
country’s fertility profile.  Arguably, the U.S. has relatively high fertility because of a 
combination of relatively low perceived conflict between work and childbearing, 
relatively low domestic time demands on female housewives and workers, and the fact 
that the monetary costs of the first and second birth are not huge.  Denmark arguably has 
relatively high fertility because of a combination of low nonmonetary and low monetary 
costs of children.   Germany arguably has relatively low fertility because of a 
combination of high monetary costs of the first birth, relatively high time demands on 
women (especially housewives), and a high perceived conflict between work and 
childrearing.  Italy arguably has low fertility because of the high nonmonetary costs of 
children.  Finally, the relatively high U.K. fertility may be attributable to the low 
perceived conflict between work and childrearing, the not-high time-demands on 
housewives and the not-high monetary costs of having children.  We note, however, that 
the costs analyzed in this paper do not explain why U.K. and U.S. fertility are higher than 
Danish fertility at parity one and at higher parities. Other factors such as additional 
dimensions of costs, or the extent to which women and men in these societies value 
children, or the timing of union formation are presumably responsible for this aspect of 
the country ordering of fertility rates.  
As we noted earlier, the tabulations of child costs presented in this paper are 
essentially descriptive.  They do not control in detail for individual heterogeneity.  This 
does not mean that the results would be different if such controls were employed.  With 
  29respect to the German-American comparison, for example, the results presented here are 
substantially in line with findings from DiPrete and McManus (2000), which used fixed 
effects regression models to control both for unmeasured permanent differences and 
unmeasured linear trends in standard of living, and found that increases in the number of 
children in the household had a more negative effect on household standard of living in 
Germany than in the U.S.   But we continue to believe that single parameter 
characterizations of a country’s costs are unlikely to adequately capture the perception of 
costs in the minds of the women and men of that country who formulate, modify and 
execute fertility plans over their life course. 
We prefer to characterize the alignment of monetary and non-monetary costs with 
fertility that we described above as a set of hypotheses concerning the fertility pattern of 
these specific countries.  As hypotheses, they need to be tested in various ways.   The 
immediately salient question, obviously, concerns the kinds of evidence that would 
provide more definitive tests of their validity.   One obvious test would be to find 
evidence of a connection between child costs and fertility across a larger number of 
countries.  Furthermore, because the cost dimensions discussed in this paper vary within 
countries as well as between them, additional tests need to simultaneously exploit 
individual-level as well as national-level variation in seeking to verify the effects of 
micro and macro variation in child costs on fertility behavior.  
Our work suggests that women do respond to their perception of the costs of 
bearing and raising children.  Time out of the labor force drives up the total cost of 
children as does the domestic burden on women of having children.  This argument 
suggests that policies which provide wide access and affordable childcare might have a 
  30positive impact on fertility, as might policies that allow for “flex-time” arrangements that 
allow women to work and simultaneously manage their household responsibilities.  Our 
data also suggest that women in some countries are not persuaded that work is in the best 
interest of their potential children or families, and that this perception of incompatibility, 
coupled with their perception that work for a women is a valued source of autonomy, 
causes them to reduce their fertility.  The resolution of this conflict arguably depends on 
the further development of scientific knowledge about the extent to which children are or 
are not harmed by their mother’s working when they are very young.  The resolution may 
also depend on a more widespread cultural acceptance of the legitimacy of a mother’s 
working when her children are still young.   
The assertion that national differences in fertility are being driven by national 
differences in child costs is a powerful claim that is only suggested by the evidence 
presented here. If confirmed in subsequent work, however, it would have major 
implications for public policy aimed at increasing sub-replacement fertility.
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1Whether the quantity of children is in fact a normal good (i.e., quantity rises with 
income) in the standard neoclassical model depends on how much of an impact the 
quantity of children has on their quality, and how much parents value quantity over 
quantity (Becker and Lewis 1973). 
2 Kögel (2002) showed that the time-series association between female labor force 
participation and total fertility has generally remained negative, and it is more negative 
for countries thought to have high family-work incompatibility (e.g., the Mediterranean 
countries)  than for countries where family-work incompatibility is lower (e.g., the 
Scandinavian countries).  It is the combination of a falling magnitude of this negative 
time-series association outside of the Mediterranean countries coupled with country 
differences in the strength of the negative time-series association across countries that 
generates the reversal in the sign of the cross-country correlation coefficient. 
3 Gauthier and Hatzius estimated that increases in family benefits of 25% (which appears 
to be equivalent to about a 1.3% after tax increase in a middle income husband’s yearly 
earnings) would increase the fertility rate by about 0.6% in the short run and about 4% in 
the long run, which amounts to only 0.07 children per woman on average.  While hardly 
trivial, this difference is small compared with observed variation in fertility rates across 
these 22 countries during 1970-1990.   
4In the case of Gauthier and Hatzius, the critical assumption is that there is no second or 
higher order serial correlation among the residuals.  But it seems unlikely that 
unmeasured factors (i.e., aside from average male and female wage levels, 
unemployment rates, and family policies) which cause one country’s fertility rate to 
differ from another will trend according to a simple AR1 process.   
5If an amount of cash equivalent to a 1.3% after tax increase in the middle-income 
husband’s earnings triggers a rise in fertility, the effect can only be interpreted as 
stimulating fertility behavior that is in line with desires for children that are otherwise 
frustrated by income constraints.  But if this were true, one would expect an increase in 
husband’s earnings per se to increase fertility, which is contradicted by the fact that the 
coefficients of husband’s earnings were insignificantly negative.   
6 Cohort trends in the distribution of completed fertility are hardly irrelevant, because 
these trends should reflect historically varying costs of children.  It is possible that cohort 
enters directly into the model to the extent that behavioral responses to a specific 
distribution of costs at a specific historical time vary by age (since calendar time minus 
age equals birth cohort).   
7 These statistics include formal child-care arrangements, including group-care in child-
care centers (nurseries, kindergartens, and other day care centers), residential care, home 
based childcare provided by relatives, and care provided by a child-care worker who is 
not a family-member.   
8 Whether this could be a function of differences in male or female expectations about 
domestic work (e.g., concerning the preparation of meals or the level of cleanliness of the 
house) cannot be answered with these data.  Cf. Bianchi et al. (2000) for a discussion of 
trends in technology and expectations in the case of the U.S. 
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9 Not all differences between countries cannot be completely summarized on a single 
dimension.  For example, while work-family incompatibility in Italy appears to be high, it 
is still the case that a high (relative to the other countries) proportion –though still a 
distinct minority -- of mothers with small children manage to combine childrearing and 
full-time work. 
10  We make these restrictions because there are important differences in the fertility 
behavior between whites and nonwhites in the U.S. and between native Germans in 
western Germany and either non-native Germans (e.g., the “Aussielders,” who claim 
German heritage and have migrated to Germany from the former Soviet Union since the 
late 1980s), or native Germans in eastern Germany).  African-Americans have much 
higher rates of out-of-wedlock fertility, and higher rates of partnership dissolution, 
because a higher proportion of partnerships are cohabitations.  African-American women 
also generally work more hours than white women because of the lower earnings of black 
men and because of the higher frequency of female-headed households in the black 
community.  We exclude Latinos from the American analysis because they are 
substantially underrepresented in the PSID.  Similarly there exist important fertility-
related differences between native West German and recent immigrant women.  The 
latter group, aside from being ethnically rather heterogeneous, have higher average labor 
force participation rates, are more likely to work full time (Dustmann and Schmidt 2000), 
and have higher average fertility rates (Mayer and Riphan 2000).  For these reasons, we 
limit our analysis to native West Germans and to whites in the U.S. (excluding Hispanic 
immigrants since 1968). 
11 The geographic identifiers in the ECHP do not distinguish between the former East 
Berlin and West Berlin. 
12 Another difference between the two sources is that the English-language version of the 
GSOEP is only a 95% random sample of the GSOEP sample, while the ECHP data 
include the full 100% sample.  For convenience, we will refer to the four country “ECHP 
data,” even though the German ECHP data are drawn from the same source as the 
GSOEP data. 
13 We used the OECD equivalence scale to adjust household income for household size.  
We used the Equivalence-File consumer-price-index deflators to adjust German and 
American currencies for inflation, which are taken from the International Financial 
Statistics Yearbook (1999). 
14Income and Earnings data for the four countries used in the ECHP analysis were 
deflated using data from U.S. BLS (2002). 
15 Our sample includes all women who met the above conditions and who were present in 
the household each year to give an interview.   For the PSID, household information is 
provided by a single adult member of the household.  In contrast, for the GSOEP and the 
ECHP surveys information is provided separately by each adult in the household.  Each 
of these surveys provides imputation methods for information that is missing, incomplete 
or suspect.  However, the GSOEP does not impute income or earnings figures for 
individuals who are adult family members but who refuse to participate in the individual-
level survey.  We set household labor earnings and household income figures for these 
families to missing, so that they drop out of computations for years involving these 
missing data.  With respect to the ECHP data, we followed a similar procedure with 
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regards to labor earnings.   The ECHP surveys (and also the BHPS and the GSOEP) also 
include a question asked of the adult who fills out the household survey to estimate the 
current net household income.   We lagged this variable and multiplied it by 12 to get a 
yearly estimate.  For years when the labor or income measures of the woman or partner 
were missing, we substituted this alternative measure of household income, which we 
then converted to a standard of living measure.  All results were weighted with the 
recommended weights for longitudinal analysis.   
16 Perhaps surprisingly, this table shows that for native West Germans with no children, 
women at the mean contribute even a greater share of household labor earnings than do 
American women.  This pattern arises from two reasons.  First, as Blau and Kahn 
demonstrated (2000), the level of inequality between women and men in a society is a 
function of the overall level of inequality.  The U.S., which has very high levels of wage 
inequality relative to other countries, has greater gender inequality as a direct 
consequence of this overall greater level of inequality.    The cross-national pattern of 
work hours offsets this pattern somewhat.  Before the first birth, German women are as 
likely to work as are American women (OECD 2002).  However, German women 
without children typically work fewer hours than American women (OECD 2002).   In 
the data under analysis here, the wage advantage for German women is larger than the 
disadvantage in hours worked, which explains their larger pre-birth household 
contribution 
This result can be seen by recasting the problem in terms of the natural logarithm 
of the ratio of the woman's labor earnings to total earnings, which can be decomposed as 
the sum of the log of her wage plus the log of her annual hours minus the log of total 
hours.  While the average log total hours for the U.S. is more positive than is the log total 
hours for Germany, the difference between the log of the woman and the log of total 
labor earnings of her and her partner is larger in Germany than in the U.S.  Blau and 
Kahn (2000) report that the wage advantage of German women over American women 
was being eroded during the 1990s, so the relative size of the female share in the two 
countries is not necessarily stable over time. 
17 Aside from the U.S. (where the figures are Meyers and Gornick’s estimate of the 
average costs across both publicly and privately provided child care), the figures from 
Meyers and Gornick pertain to the parents’ share of the total costs for publicly-provided 
child care only.  These figures are plausible estimates for parental share of total child care 
costs only to the extent that most child care in a country is provided by publicly-operated 
child care centers.  This condition is true in Denmark (Meyers and Gornick 2003), but not 
in the UK.  In Germany and Italy few young children receive paid care, so the distinction 
has no major consequences for our purposes. 
18 For the UK, we assumed that parents pay the same share of costs as in the U.S. 
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Table 1. Parity Progression Ratios (PPR) from Period Data, Unadjusted and Adjusted for Tempo Shifts,  
for Selected Countries. 
 
     Parity-Specific Progression Ratios 
      Unadjusted  Adjusted for Tempo Shifts 
  TFR      TFR' 0→1    1→2 2→3 0→1    1→2 2→3 
                                                    Panel A:  1985-1989 
United States
  1.90              1.98 0.79 0.77 0.61 0.85 0.77 0.55
U.S. Non-Hispanic Whites
  1.70                1.88 0.75 0.79 0.43 0.86 0.78 0.47
Denmark
  1.52                1.63 0.70 0.80 0.50 0.83 0.81 0.39
Italy
  1.32                1.63 0.62 0.77 0.56 0.78 0.76 0.44
West Germany
  1.35                1.49 0.60 0.77 0.65 0.67 0.79 0.56
United  Kingdom                  1.79 2.01 0.71 0.87 0.66 0.80 0.87 0.58
          
                                                    Panel B:  1990’s 
United States (1990-94)
  2.05              2.17 0.86 0.75 0.57 0.89 0.79 0.56
U.S. Non-Hispanic Whites (1991-95)
  1.81                1.91 0.74 0.8 0.62 0.97 0.72 0.53
Denmark  1993-94  1.73                1.86 0.8 0.76 0.46 0.99 0.71 0.35
Italy 1993-94
  1.22                1.44 0.62 0.7 0.48 0.73 0.70 0.39
West Germany
      1.45  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
United Kingdom 1993-94  1.82  2.04  0.74  0.83  0.66  0.84  0.83  0.59 
Sources for above estimates:  
U.S.  Authors’ calculations from NCHS data. Estimates are 5-year average of yearly estimates.  
U.S. non-Hispanic Whites.  From CPS data estimated by Morgan and Yang (2002).   
Denmark, Italy and West Germany. Authors’ calculations from Eurostat Data. Estimates are averages of yearly estimates.  
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Table 2: Employment Patterns for Mothers with a Child under 6, Germany  













  Couple Headed Families 



















Proportion with man full-time, 







































































  Lone Parent Families 
















































Notes: a) Data for Germany refer to 1991, Data for the U.S. and the U.K. to 1989, Data for Denmark to 
1990 and 1997. 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (2001: 134f), Ejrnes et al. (2002).  
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Table 3: Formal Child-Care Coverage, Statutory Parental Leave Policies,  
and Tax and Family Allowance Policies.  
 
 Germany U.S. Denmark Italy  U.K.
Proportion of children under 
3 in formal childcare 
10 54 64 6 34
Proportion of children from 
3 to mandatory school age  
in formal childcare 
78 70 91 95 60
Legislated job protection  yes no yes yes  yes
Paid maternity leave (weeks)  14 0 30 21.5  18
Wage replacement rate (% 
wages) 
100 0 100 80 46
Coverage (% of employed 
women) 
100 25 100 100 60
Consecutive weeks of 
maternity and parental leave 
162 12 60.5 64.5 44
Weeks of paid maternity 
leave 
14 0 28 20 18
Paternity benefits  yes no Yes yes  no












Family allowances  






Tax relief and family 
allowance as percent of the 
avg. male manufacturing 
wage (comparing single-
earner couple with 2 children 






Notes: Statistics for the child-care coverage refers to 1995 for the United States, 1998 for Denmark and 
Italy, and 2000 for the U.K. and Denmark.  Statistics for paid maternity leave refer to 1990, family 
allowances and tax effects are for 1990.   
Note (a) Only Means tested benefits are available. 
Source: OECD (2001: 144); Gornick et al. (1997: 57); Gauthier (1996; p. 166, 174) 
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Table 4: Average Time Spent on Child-Care and Domestic Labor per Day in Couple 
Families with a Child under 5 in united Germany, U.S., Italy, Denmark  
















Men  59 33 36 28 87 
Women in full time jobs  124  62  96  55  120 
Women in part time jobs  142  93  n.a.  41  154 
Housewives 175  106  120  87  205 
 
 
Other Unpaid Work (Hours) 
Men  2.5 2.0 1.2 1.9 1.7 
Women in full time jobs  4.2  3.3  4.8  3.1  5.4 
Women in part time jobs  5.0  3.1  n.a.  4.1  4.2 
Housewives  5.8 4.4 7.0 5.4 4.7 
 
 
Total Domestic Work (Hours) 
Men  3.5 2.6 1.8 2.4 3.2 
Women in full time jobs  6.3  4.3  6.4  4.0  7.4 
Women in part time jobs  7.4  4.7  n.a.  4.8  6.8 
Housewives  8.7 6.2 9.0 6.9 8.1 
Source: OECD (2001: 140). 
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Table 5:  Percentage of Women Aged 18 to 35 who Agree or Strongly Agree 
 
  Germany  Great Britain United States  Italy  Norway  Sweden 
A pre-school child is likely to 
suffer if his/her mother works. 
  
61.2 %  23.9 % 
(24.9 %) 
 
25.5 %  60.9 % 
(61.0 %) 
18.4 %  18.0 % 
(18.0 %) 
All in all, family life suffers when 
a woman has a full-time job. 
 
48.5 %  23.2 % 
(21.5 %) 
21.5 %  46.9 % 
(48.7 %) 
24.8 %  23.2 % 
(24.6 %) 
Being a housewife is just as 
fulfilling as working for pay. 
 
30.4 %  42.9 % 
(41.9 %) 
53.3 %  16.8 % 
(17.5 %) 
25.2 %  24.4 % 
(24.0 %) 
Having a job is the best way for a 
woman to be an independent 
person. 
 
79.8 %  55.1 % 
(54.0 %) 
50.5 %  80.1 % 
(79.8 %) 
39.3 %  47.8 % 
(46.2 %) 
A man's job is to earn money; a 
woman's job is to look after the 
home and family. 
 
17.7 %  10.7 % 
(11.3 %) 
8.4 %  11.7 % 
(13.1 %) 
4.0 %  9.1 % 
(9.9 %) 
Source: ISSP 1994, own calculations, unweighted results. Weights were not available for all countries. Where available, weighted results are shown in 
parentheses.  Data for Germany are for the former West-Germany only. 
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Table 6          
   
   
     
Income and Standard of Living Changes in Response to Birth, for Women 18-40 in Focal Year   
Comparing One Calendar Year Ahead of the Focal Year with Two Years before the Focal Year 
 
 
No Previous Children, Partner in HH at Survey Date of Previous Year   
   Birth in Focal Year  No Birth in Focal Year 
  
Ethnic Germans in W. 
Germany  U.S. Whites 
Ethnic Germans in W. 
Germany  U.S. Whites 
Mean Effects  Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  43% 2% 39% 1% 43% 1% 39% 1%
Share of Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  10% 2% 28% 2% 45% 2% 44% 1%
Change in Pre-Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income  -36% 2% -20% 3% 14% 3% 7% 2%
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income -22% 2% -15% 2% 11% 2% 7% 2%
                       
25th Percentile        
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  32%   27%   25%   27%  
Share of Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  0%   1%   29%   28%  
Change in Pre-Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income  -50%   -35%   -5%   -9%  
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income -36%   -28%   -4%   -7%  
                       
Median        
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  43%   39%   43%   40%  
Share of Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  0%   22%   43%   42%  
Change in Pre-Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income  -38%   -18%   19%   15%  
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income -23%   -15%   15%   16%  
                    
75th Percentile        
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  51%   48%   54%   50%  
Share of Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  8%   43%   56%   57%  
Change in Pre-Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income  -18%   6%   65%   50%  
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income -5%   7%   43%   47%  
N (distinct individuals)  319   342   627   484  
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Table 7          
     
Income and Standard of Living Changes in Response to Birth, for Women 18-40 in Focal Year         
Comparing One Calendar Year Ahead of the Focal Year with Two Years before the Focal Year 
 
       
Children Under 6 in HH, Partner in HH at Survey Date of Previous Year   
   Birth in Focal Year  No Birth in Focal Year 
  
Ethnic Germans in W. 
Germany U.S.  Whites 
Ethnic Germans in W. 
Germany U.S.  Whites 
Mean Effects  Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  16% 2% 22% 1% 13% 1% 21% 1%
Share of Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  7% 2% 23% 1% 17% 1% 29% 1%
Change in Pre-Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income  -17% 3% -17% 2% 2% 2% -1% 1%
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income -11% 2% -12% 2% 0% 1% 3% 1%
                       
25th Percentile        
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  0%   1%   0%   0%  
Share of Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  0%   0%   0%   0%  
Change in Pre-Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income  -35%   -36%   -27%   -30%  
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income -27%   -29%   -23%   -23%  
                       
Median        
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  9%   21%   7%   17%  
Share of Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  0%   12%   2%   22%  
Change in Pre-Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income  -17%   -13%   -4%   -7%  
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income -10%   -10%   -3%   -2%  
                    
75th Percentile        
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  32%   38%   33%   39%  
Share of Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  3%   39%   26%   46%  
Change in Pre-Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income  2%   12%   20%   22%  
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income 7%   12%   13%   21%  
N (distinct individuals)  336   483   864   1016  
  47Table 8               
Income and Standard of Living Changes in Response to Birth, for Women 18-40 in Focal Year    
Comparing Average 4 years from Birth Year with Two Years before the Focal Year       
   Birth in Focal Year  No Birth in Focal Year 
Estimated Change in Standard of 
Living 
Ethnic Germans in 
W. Germany  U.S. Whites 
Ethnic Germans in 
W. Germany  U.S. Whites 
    Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.  Estimate S.E.
   No Previous Children 
Mean: Pre-Tax/Transfer SOL
a  -26% 2% -14% 2% 12% 3%  11% 2%
Mean:  Post-Tax/Transfer  SOL  -14% 2% -10% 2% 12% 2%  10% 2%
                      
25th Pct: Pre-Tax/Transfer SOL  -40%    -32%   -8%   -11%   
25th Pct: Pre-Tax/Transfer SOL  -28%    -26%   -3%   -8%   
                      
Median: Pre-Tax/Transfer SOL  -29%    -14%   14%   16%   
Median: Pre-Tax/Transfer SOL  -15%    -11%   15%   14%   
                  
75th Pct: Pre-Tax/Transfer SOL  -10%    8%   53%   49%   
75th Pct: Pre-Tax/Transfer SOL  -1%    9%   42%   43%   
N (distinct individuals)  273    300   514   411   
   Children Under 6 in Household 
Mean: Pre-Tax/Transfer SOL  -10%  3% -8% 2% 4% 2%  4%  1%
Mean:  Post-Tax/Transfer  SOL  -6% 2% -4% 2% 2% 1%  6% 1%
                      
25th Pct: Pre-Tax/Transfer SOL  -33%    -26%   -25%   -24%   
25th Pct: Pre-Tax/Transfer SOL  -25%    -22%   -20%   -19%   
                      
Median: Pre-Tax/Transfer SOL  -11%    -7%   -3%   -4%   
Median: Pre-Tax/Transfer SOL  -4%    -4%   -3%   0%   
                  
75th Pct: Pre-Tax/Transfer SOL  8%    16%   21%   20%   
75th Pct: Pre-Tax/Transfer SOL  10%    15%   14%   21%   
N (distinct individuals)  276    403   723   894   
Notes 
aSOL (“standard of living”) is the size-adjusted household income       
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Income and Standard of Living Changes in Response to Birth, for Women 18-40 in Focal Year     
Comparing One Calendar Year Ahead of the Focal Year with Two Years before the Focal Year 
  
   
No Children 0-5 and Partner in HH at Survey Date of Previous Year, 1994-1999    
   Birth in Focal Year  No Birth in Focal Year  
   Denmark  West Germany Italy  UK  Denmark 
West 
Germany      Italy UK
Mean Effects  Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. EstimateS.E.EstimateS.E.EstimateS.E.EstimateS.E.EstimateS.E.
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  42% 2% 36% 7% 26%  2%  47% 2% 38% 2% 28% 1% 25% 1% 38% 1%
Share of Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  37% 3% 28% 3% 26%  2%  39% 3% 42% 1% 34% 2% 25% 1% 39% 1%
Share of 1st Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  39% 3% 5% 2% 25%  2%  31% 3% 42% 1% 35% 2% 26% 1% 40% 1%
Change in Woman's Labor Income   -15% 10% -76% 6% -7%  7%  -46% 5% 21% 7% 14% 4% 7% 3% 18% 4%
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income -11% 3% -21% 5% -10%  5%  -14% 4% 7% 2% 0% 2% 3% 2% 11% 2%
                                              
25th Percentile                         
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  34%  13%   0%    36%   24%  3%   0%   17%  
Share of Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  26%  9%   0%    20%   31%  9%   0%   20%  
Share of 1st Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  24%  0%   0%    0%   31%  9%   0%   22%  
Change in Woman's Labor Income   -40%  -86%   -15%    -85%   -12%  -9%   -4%   -7%  
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income -24%  -36%   -35%    -33%   -15%  -14%   -21%   -11%  
                                          
Median                       
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  43%  39%   25%    46%   39%  25%   20%   38%  
Share of Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  39%  27%   21%    36%   42%  32%   17%   38%  
Share of 1st Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  39%  0%   23%    28%   42%  29%   20%   38%  
Change in Woman's Labor Income   -1%  -86%   0%    -24%   9%  0%   0%   11%  
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income -10%  -22%   -12%    -15%   3%  -2%   0%   11%  
                                      
75th Percentile                       
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  49%  48%   48%    56%   49%  42%   45%   52%  
Share of Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  49%  33%   45%    51%   50%  49%   45%   51%  
Share of 1st Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  47%  3%   45%    51%   51%  50%   45%   55%  
Change in Woman's Labor Income   28%  -23%   0%    8%   98%  39%   11%   67%  
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income 4%  -18%   11%    7%   33%  18%   28%   48%  
N (distinct individuals)  77   107   228    160   340   685   1012   805  
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Income and Standard of Living Changes in Response to Birth, for Women 18-40 in Focal Year     
Comparing One Calendar Year Ahead of the Focal Year with Two Years before the Focal Year 
 
   
Some Children 0-5 and Partner in HH at Survey Date of Previous Year      
   Birth in Focal Year   No Birth in Focal Year  
   Denmark  West Germany Italy  UK  Denmark 
West 
Germany      Italy UK
Mean Effects  Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. EstimateS.E.EstimateS.E.EstimateS.E.EstimateS.E.Estimate S.E.
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  34% 3% 19% 3% 18%  2%  26% 2% 35% 1% 16% 2% 21% 1% 25%  1%
Share of Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  27% 3% 12% 3% 17%  2%  20% 2% 38% 1% 16% 2% 22% 1% 25%  1%
Share of 1st Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  30% 3% 8% 3% 16%  2%  23% 3% 41% 1% 18% 2% 22% 1% 27%  1%
Change in Woman's Labor Income   -13% 11% -54% 6% -3%  8%  -26% 8% 27% 6% 4% 7% 3% 3% 14%  4%
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income  -7% 3% -7% 3% -4%  8%  -3% 5% -1% 1% -3% 2% 1% 2% 7%  2%
                                              
25th Percentile                            
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  20%  0%   0%    0%   23%  0%   0%   0%   
Share of Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  2%  0%   0%    0%   19%  0%   0%   0%   
Share of 1st Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  0%  0%   0%    0%   28%  0%   0%   0%   
Change in Woman's Labor Income   -60%  -86%   -7%    -49%   -9%  -74%   -2%   -31%   
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income  -19%  -20%   -33%    -28%   -16%  -25%   -23%   -15%   
                                              
Median                           
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  38%  8%   1%    24%   40%  6%   3%   24%   
Share of Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  28%  0%   0%    12%   38%  0%   4%   22%   
Share of 1st Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  34%  0%   0%    10%   42%  4%   1%   22%   
Change in Woman's Labor Income   0%  -4%   0%    0%   5%  0%   0%   0%   
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income  -8%  -11%   -12%    -6%   -1%  -7%   -3%   7%   
                                         
75th Percentile                           
Share of Base Year HH Labor Earnings  49%  32%   38%    43%   49%  35%   43%   44%   
Share of Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  45%  14%   33%    32%   48%  22%   43%   39%   
Share of 1st Post-Focal Year HH Labor Earnings  45%  5%   34%    33%   50%  23%   43%   39%   
Change in Woman's Labor Income   44%  0%   1%    5%   51%  33%   8%   56%   
Change in Post Tax/Transfer Size Adjusted HH Income  7%  13%   15%    18%   14%  6%   24%   39%   
N (distinct individuals)  90   108   152    161   358   526   953   682   
  50Table 11:       
Proportions of Households Paying for Childcare at Survey Time in the Year Following the Focal Year 
Partner in HH at Survey Date of Previous Year, 1995-1997 Focal Year     
       
U.S. Denmark Italy UK Germany*
(PSID) (ECHP) (ECHP) (ECHP) (ECHP)
Birth in Focal Year & No Children 0-5 in HH  56% 58% 10%  36% 6%
Birth in Focal Year & Some Children 0-5 in HH  51% 79% 29%  22% 61%
No Birth in Focal Year & No Children 0-5 in HH  3% 23% 4%  4% 1%
No Birth in Focal Year & Some Children 0-5 in HH  52% 83% 22%  24% 54%
       
  Percent of Total Child Care Costs Paid by Parents 
            60%       16-25%        12%            N/A  15%
       
 
Estimated Mean Expenditures for Those who Pay,  
from Panel Data (1991 Dollars) 
  $2,720            
 
Estimated Mean Percent of HH Post-Tax/Transfer Income 
Paid for Childcare, by Those who Pay, From Panel Data 
  5%           
       
 
Median Change in Post-Government SOL  
from Tables 6, 7,  9, and 10 
Birth in Focal Year & No Children 0-5 in HH  -15% -10% -12%  -15% -22%
Birth in Focal Year & Some Children 0-5 in HH  -10% -8% -12%  -6% -11%
 
Crudely Adjusted Median Change, Taking Child Care Costs 
into Account 
Birth in Focal Year & No Children 0-5 in HH  -17% -11% -12%  -17% -22%
Birth in Focal Year & Some Children 0-5 in HH  -12% -9% -12%  -7% -12%
Source: Child care parental contributions from Meyers and Gornick 2000.  U.S. figure is share of all public and private 
costs, taken from Meyers and Gornick 2003.       
* only 1995 focal year       
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Table 12.  A Comparison of the Rank Order of Countries Based on Fertility Rates, Parity Progression 
Ratios, and Costs of Children Measures 
 
  Denmark U.S.
1 U.K.  Germany  Italy 
I. FERTILITY RATES  Countries Ranked from High to Low 
Unadjusted TFR  1985-89  3 2 1 4 5 
Adjusted TFR 1985-89    3 2 1 5 3 
Unadjusted TFR 1990’s  3 2 1 4 5 
Adjusted TFR 1990’s  3 2 1 ~4  ~4 
Tempo-Adjusted PPR at Parity 
0 (most recent data) 
1 2 3 5 4 
Tempo-Adjusted PPR at Parity 
1 (most recent data) 
4 3 1 2 5 
II. COSTS OF CHILDREN  Countries Ranked from Low to High 
II.a. Non-Monetary Costs   
Time Demands, Full Time 
Female Workers 
1 2 5 3 4 
Time Demands, Housewives  2 1 3 4 5 
Perceived Conflict between 
Work and Childrearing 
(1)
2 2  2  4  4 
II. b. Short-Term Impact on 
Household SOL 
 
Median 3yr change in SOL,  
NO young children in HH  
1  ~2 (3)  ~2 (3)  5  ~2 (2) 
Median 3yr change in SOL, 
young children in HH 
~1 (2)  ~3 (3)  ~1 (1)  ~3 (4)  ~3 (5) 
Median 3yr change in SOL,  
NO young children in HH, 
including childcare costs 
~1(1) 3 
 
3 5  ~1(2) 
Median 3yr change in SOL, 
young children in HH, 
including childcare costs 
2 3 1 3 3 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are used to indicate approximate ties when numerical differences between countries 
are small. 
                                                 
1 Fertility ranking is based on rates for the non-Hispanic white population. 
2 Based on the ISSP data for Norway and Sweden. 